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A PRACTICAL VIEW OF THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT-LOWER COURT
INTERPRETATIONS AND THE SUPREME
COURT'S REACTION
The eleventh amendment' recently has emerged from the obscurity
which surrounded its first 170 years of existence. Several aspects of con-
temporary political life have combined to cause heavier reliance on the
amendment by state governments.2 The scope of government activity
has widened to include areas previously under private control.3 In -addi-
tion, due process and equal protection concepts have been expanded to
include previously unrecognized claims against government defendants.
4
Coupled with the broader interpretation of these constitutional protec-
tions is the heightened public interest in litigation against governmental
organizations, evidenced by the increasing number of pro se cases against
state officials or agencies. 5
1 U.S. CoNsT. amend. 11. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." Id. The eleventh amendment was proposed by Congress on March 4,
1794, and declared to have been ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures on
January 8, 1798. See 6 A2NAs OF CoNGSS 809 (1798); 3 ANNALS OF CoNG.Ess 476-77
(1794).
2 Between 1964 and 1972, eleventh amendment cases increased threefold in both the
district courts and the courts of appeals.
3 The recent proliferation of agency groups at the state level has shifted the emphasis
of private suits from those against state officers and employees to suits against public
authorities and municipal corporations. See S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. New Jersey
Turnpike Authority, 268 F. Supp. 568, 574 (D.N.J. 1967). These agencies, although
usually performing governmental functions, are not synonymous per se with the "state"
described in the eleventh amendment. See, e.g., Southern Bridge Co. v. Department of
Highways, 319 F. Supp. 948 (E.D. La. 1970); George A. Fuller Co. v. Coastal Plains,
Inc., 290 F. Supp. 911, 914 (E.D. La. 1968); S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. New Jersey Turn-
pike Authority, supra at 573-75; notes 72-80 infra and accompanying text. But see Harris
v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 410 F.2d 1332, 1333-34 n.1 (3d Cir. 1969). The dis-
tinction has forced increasing judicial awareness of the problems created by expansion
of the amendments scope beyond suits against the state as the party of record. See also
Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a) (1) (ii) (1970) (suits against government
instrumentalities permitted to extent allowed by eleventh amendment).
4 See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HA~v. L. REv. 1065,
1067-68 (1969). From a broad equal protection interpretation have emerged new classes
of suits against states or state agencies. Among them are those concerning state educa-
tion financing. See Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Md. 1972); Serrano v. Priest,
5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971) (en bane).
5 See, e.g., Meyer v. New Jersey, 460 F.2d 1252 (3d Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Shapiro
v. Maryland, 336 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Md. 1972); Wilgus v. Peterson, 335 F. Supp. 1385
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The rediscovery of the amendment, which is a limitation on federal
court jurisdiction where the state is a defendant, has coincided with the
resurrection of judicial arguments for increased abstention by federal
courts in favor of state courts.6 The eleventh amendment may be the
means by which courts justify increasing abstention and thus may be
the vehicle by which the division of labor between federal and state
courts is restructured. However, strict interpretation of the amendment
would increase the number of suits which could be brought only in
state courts, thereby leaving some classes of plaintiffs virtually remedi-
less. Therefore, the practical effect of the amendment should be under-
stood fully before it is applied, and its use should be limited by a full
comprehension of its original purpose-the preservation of federalism.
PURPOSE OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
The eleventh amendment was added to the Constitution to protect
both the sovereignty of the states7 and the sanctity of their treasuries.8
Although article III of the Constitution had granted the Supreme Court
jurisdiction to hear cases "between a State and Citizens of another
State," 9 substantial controversy existed whether this included suits in
which the state was a defendant.'0 When Chief Justice Jay, in Chishohn
v. Georgia," stated that it did,' 2 the eleventh amendment was passed to
counteract the effects of the decision.13
The amendment is not, however, an unconditional recognition of the
absolute sovereignty of the states14 and must be read in the context of
(D. Del. 1972). This development of public interest law also has resulted in a greater
number of suits against public officials.
6 See, e.g., Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 604 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring);
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439-43 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 86 (1970).
7 See Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation, 2 GA. L. Rv.
207, 224-30 (1968).
8 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821); 1 C. WARaEN, Tan
SuaaRm CouRr iN UNnmn STATEs HISToRY 99 (1922). Sovereignty theories were far
less important than fear of financial disaster if suits against states could be maintained
successfully. Id. at 99. But see Tim Fsuzzaxasr No. 81, at 511 (Wright ed. 1961).
9 U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
10 Mathis, supra note 7, at 211-14.
112 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
12 Id. at 476-78.
13 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821); Mathis, supra note 7,
at 227-28. See generally C. JACOBS, TiH EravaEtrn AM V MENT & SoVaRMIGN IMMUNITY
27-40 (1972).
14The amendment serves as a buffer between the limited sovereignty of the states
and the overriding power of the federal government. Cf. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S.
535, 542 (1972), quoting King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968); Rothstein v. Wyman,
467 F.2d 226, 232 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.SL.W. 3527 (U.S. Apr. 2, 1973).
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the whole Constitution. 5 This interpretive framework for the eleventh
amendment was recognized in 1903 when the Court stated:
It would, indeed, be most unfortunate if the immunity of the in-
dividual States from suits by citizens of other States, provided
for in the Eleventh Amendment, were to be interpreted as nulli-
fying those 6ther provisions which confer power on Congress....
Much less can the Eleventh Amendment be successfully pleaded
as an invincible barrier to judicial inquiry whether the salutary
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment have been disre-
garded... ." 16
The Court's candid statement indicates that the limitation is grounded
not only in the original Constitution but also in later conceptions of state
sovereignty resulting from events such as the Civil War.17 The adoption
of the thirteenth through fifteenth amendments is evidence of this
changed conception.' 8 Although later courts have been less explicit in
defining the amendment's scope, they have continued to recognize that
the dual sovereignties concept places limits on its literal wording.'9
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
The eleventh amendment appears on its face to bar absolutely the
jurisdiction of the federal courts in suits by individuals against states.
20
See also Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (waiver of immunity by
entry into federal field "is in accord with the common sense of this Nation's federalism");
Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205, 1212 (2d Cir. 1972) (Lumbard, J, concurring)
(limitation of federal jurisdiction is an attempt to minimize the potential for conflict
between the federal and state systems). The limitation is based at least in part upon
the premise that state courts, to the same extent as federal courts, are obligated to en-
force the United States Constitution. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 176 (1908)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
15 See Prout v. Starr, 188 U.. 537, 543 (1903); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 144 U.S. 270,
286 (1885); Pilling, An Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 15 MicH. L. REv.
468 (1917).
16 Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537, 543 (1903); see Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184,
196 (1964). Although the Supreme Court has not found the amendment a limitation on
pre-existing clauses of the Constitution, it has been urged to do so in several dissents.
See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 182 (1908) (Harlan, J, dissenting); Virginia Coupon
Cases, 114 U.S. 270, 331 (1885) (Bradley, J, dissenting). The Court reconsidered the
issue this term. See Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department
of Pub. Health & Welfare, 41 U.SJL.W. 4493 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1973).
1' See Pilling, supra note 15, at 469.
Is See id.
19 See Note, Private Suits Against States in the Federal Courts, 33 U. CHm. L. REv. 331,
333 n.10 (1966); note 14 supra.
20 The amendment, while speaking only of suits in law or equity, has been held equally
applicable to suits in admirality. See Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 503, 510-11 (1921);
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However, interpretation by the courts has been inconsistent with the
terms of the amendment, and in practice the amendment has never been
held a complete bar.21 Its effect has been limited by the use of legal
fictions22 and by the concept of waivability.23 Partially because the
amendment was passed to overrule a Supreme Court decision,24 its effect
at first was restricted severely by the Court. In Cobens v. Virginia25
Chief Justice Marshall suggested that the amendment only encompassed
suits by individuals requesting payment of state debts.2 6 Three years
later in Osborn v. Bank of the United States,2 7 Marshall declared that
the amendment was applicable only when the state was a party of rec-
ord28 and consequently opened the great eleventh amendment loophole-
naming a state officer as defendant rather than the state.2 9 This limiting
interpretation of the amendment prevailed until the late nineteenth cen-
tury, when the dire financial condition of the states reldndled judicial
awareness of the original purposes of the amendment.
After 1880, in a series of cases involving attempts by individuals to
force states either to pay interest on state bonds 0 or to accept bond
Principe Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Board of Comm'rs, 333 F. Supp. 353, 354 (E.D. La.
1971); Fylipoy v. Gulf Stevadore Corp., 257 F. Supp. 166, 168 (SJD. Tex. 1966). See also
Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921). The amendment also applies when a state
is impleaded in an existing suit. See Lee v. Brooks, 315 F. Supp. 729, 730 (D. Hawaii
1970).
2 In the first case dealing directly with the eleventh amendment, Chief Justice Marshall
held that the prohibition did not extend to appeals from criminal convictions where
the state became the party defendant. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 407
(1821).
22 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-60, 167 (1908); notes 103-107 infra and ac-
companying text.
23 See Clark v. Baranrd, 108 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1883); note 114 infra and accompanying
text.
24The amendment overruled Chisholm v. Georgia. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); see
Holingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 381 (1798).
25 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
26 Id. at 406-07.
27 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
28 Id. at 857. Chief Justice Marshall admitted, however, that the officer named must
have some personal responsibility for the act charged. Id. at 858-59. This requirement
was the basis for the first break-down in the party of record restriction when, in
Hagood v. Southern, the Court found that a suit against a state comptroller-general to
force specific performance of a bond contract was a suit against the state even though
it was not a party defendant, because the named party had no personal interest in the
suit. 117 U.S. 52, 67 (1886).
29 The theory was that an act by a state officer under an unconstitutional law is not
the act of the state at all and therefore suit to enjoin the officer's action could be main-
tained in federal court without running afoul of the eleventh amendment. 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) at 836-37; see notes 102-107 infra and accompanying text.
30 See Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1882).
HeinOnline  -- 61 Geo. L. J.  1476 1972-1973
1973] ELEVENTH AMENDMENr 1477
coupons in payment of state taxes,81 the Court gave the eleventh amend-
ment its broadest interpretation. In In re Ayres
2 and Hans v. Louisiana,as
the Court barred any suit in federal court against either a state or its
officials if the purpose of the suit was to enforce a state contract. 4 How-
31 See, e.g., In re Ayres, 123 U.S. 443 (1887); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1886);
Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269 (1885). The Virginia Coupon Cases were of two
types. In Poindexter .v. Greenhow, persons whose property was taken for non-payment
of taxes claimed tender of Virginia bond coupons in satisfaction of the taxes as a basis
for their suit in detinue. Id. at 273-74. The Court held that it had jurisdiction to consider
the validity of the refusal to accept the coupons as part of the suit against the officer
for a personal trespass, and that the claim was not barred as a suit against the state. Id.
at 288. However, in Carter v. Greenhow, the Court found that a suit for damages for
refusal to accept the coupons tendered did not state a cause of action. 114 U.S. at 317,
320, 323. While the majority in these cases did not find the suits barred by the eleventh
amendment, the four dissenting justices, foreshadowing the decisions in Hagood and
Ayres, did. Id. at 338 (Bradley, J., Waite, C.J., Miller & Gray, JJ., dissenting). The dis-
sent argued that a claim that an act of a state is unconstitutional can be maintained in
district court only in response to an aggressive act by the state, and cannot be brought
to force the state to act where it has declined to do so. Id. at 335-37.
32 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
33 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
34 Id. at 20-21; 123 U.S. at 505. Suits alleging unconstitutional impairment of contract
obligations were also included in the eleventh amendment prohibition. See id. In Ayres,
the Court found, as a collateral issue, that a non-citizen of Virginia could not bring
suit in federal court against the state attorney general to enjoin actions amounting to a
breach of contract. Id. at 502-03. The Court found that the suit was against the state
and barred by the eleventh. id. at 507. In Hans, this restriction was extended to cover
suits by citizens of a state against their own state. 134 U.S. at 15. See also New Hamp-
shire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 91 (1883). The Hans extension also applies to third
party actions against a state. Lee v. Brooks, 315 F. Supp. 729 (D. Hawaii 1970).
There has been much discussion whether the decision in Hans amounted to an ex-
tension of the eleventh amendment or whether it was merely an interpretation of the
original limitations on the jurisdiction of the federal courts found in article III of the
Constitution or in common law sovereign immunity. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377
U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (eleventh); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 51 (1944)
(common law); Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497-98 (1921) (eleventh); Duhne v.
New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311, 313 (1920) (Constitution construed as a whole); Miller,
Service of Process on State, Local, and Foreign Governments Under Rule 4, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure-Some Unfinished Business for the Rulemakers, 46 F.R.D. 101,
108-09 & n.22 (1969) (article III). See generally Comment, Private Suits Against States
in the Federal Courts, 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 331, 334-35 (1966). The article III theory
finds support in the dissenting opinion in the Virginia Coupon Cases. See 114 U.S. at
337-38 (Bradley, J, Waite, C.J., Miller & Gray, J.J., dissenting). This is indicative of
the basis of Hans because the dissent in the Virginia Coupon Cases and the majority'
opinion in Hans were both written by Justice Bradley, and the dissenting justices in the
Virginia Coupon Cases joined the majority in Hans. Compare 134 U.S. at 9 vith 114
U.S. at 330. The debate is historically interesting, but its only practical effect would
arise from a decision that the eleventh amendment, as a specific limitation on article III,
actually permits suits by citizens against their own states by not forbidding them. The
Supreme Court considered the issue this term in Employees of the Department of Public
Health & Welfare v. Department of Public Health & Welfare, and appears to have
determined that Hans rests on the eleventh amendment. 41 U.S.L.W. 4493, 4494 (U.S.
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ever, this expansive interpretation of the eleventh was limited in 1908 by
Ex parte Young.35 In a return to Chief Justice Marshall's position in
Osborn,8 6 the Young Court held that, because actions by a state officer
to enforce a statute alleged to be unconstitutional were not acts of the
state, the eleventh amendment did not bar a suit to enjoin such acts87
Although the Court in Young refused to overrule Ayres,8 8 it can be
argued that the cases are factually indistinguishable. 9 Both Ayres and
Young involved an ultimate incident of state sovereignty-the power of
a state to use its own courts to enforce its laws.40 These two cases reached
the Supreme Court in habeas corpus petitions from state attorneys gen-
eral jailed for refusal to obey federal court injunctions forbidding them
to bring suits to enforce certain state laws.41 Allowing the injunction
actions in federal courts strengthens the dual sovereignties interpretation
of the amendment 42 and suggests that the amendment is not in fact a bar
Apr. 18, 1973). Justice Marshall concurring and Justice Brennan in dissent disagreed,
Marshall viewing Has as based on article III, and Brennan seeing it as a common law
immunity case. Id. at 4497, 4504.
85 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
86 See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 737, 836-87 (1824).
837 209 U.S. at 159-60.
88 Id. at 152-53.
89 See id. at 189-90 (Harlan, J, dissenting). In Ayres, an injunction prevented the Vir-
ginia Attorney General from instituting suit to recover taxes paid with state bond
coupons on the grounds that such action violated the contract clause of the Constitution.
123 US. at 486-87. In Young an injunction forbade the Minnesota Attorney General
to institute suit to enforce a rate-making law because the law amounted to an uncon-
stitutional taking of property. 209 U.S. at 131-32. The essential issue in each case was
whether the lower federal court had jurisdiction to entertain the original suit. See 209
U.S. at 134; 123 U.S. at 485-87. The Court in Young distinguished Ayres on the ground
that Ayres was brought to enforce a contract whereas the action in Young was de-
signed to prevent enforcement of a law. 209 U.S. at 152-53, 167. Justice Harlan main-
tained that the same question was crucial in each-could a federal court bar a state
from the use of its own court to enforce its own laws? Id. at 190, 203-04 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). See also Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 304-05 (1952).
40 209 U.S. at 190, 203-04 (Harlan, J., dissenting). This issue recently has been con-
sidered by the Court in the context of the federal anti-injunction statute. Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225, (1972); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283 (1970). The Court in Younger found that the anti-injunction statute limited the
power of federal courts to interfere in state court proceedings because of the principles
of equity, comity and federalism. 401 U.S. at 43-45; see Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225, 243 (1972). However, the Court explicitly refrained from considering the effect of
the statute in the Younger situation, where state court proceedings had not begun before
the injunction issued. 401 U.S. at 41. Even if the Younger situation were to come within
the present interpretation of the anti-injunction statute, the barring of this extreme form
of federal interference with the states should not significantly affect the power of the
federal courts in most suits against states.
41209 U.S. at 126; 123 U.S. at 445.
42 See notes 14-19 supra and accompanying text.
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to federal court jurisdiction where an unconstitutional act by the state
or its officers is alleged. This less restrictive interpretation of the amend-
ment in constitutional cases has continued and is especially apparent in
the Court's actions in school desegregation 3 and reapportionment cases.
44
Until the middle of this century, the Supreme Court considered the
eleventh amendment almost exclusively in the context of constitutional
claims. The more recent decisions in the non-constitutional areas have
been more internally consistent than those involving the Constitution.
Suits based on federal statutory causes of action usually revolve around
the issue of constructive waiver of immunity by the state's entry into
a federal sphere of regulation. 45 However, a recent district court decision
suggests that a constructive or explicit waiver is not in fact a prerequisite
for federal jurisdiction over any federally based claim against a state.46
During the 1972 term, for the first time since the birth of the construc-
tive waiver doctrine in 1964,47 the Supreme Court reconsidered the
issue.48 Suits against a state on a cause of action created solely by state
law consistently have been barred from federal court unless the state
has given clear consent to suit in that court.49 Claims against states by
name on common law causes of action have been fairly rare,50 and the
major issue in suits against a state agency usually is whether the suit is
in fact against the state and, therefore, barred by the amendment.51
43See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 228 (1964); Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950).
44 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
45 See notes 130-144 infra and accompanying text.
46See Burnham v. Department of Pub. Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335, 1341 (ND. Ga.
1972).
47 See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 196-97 (1964) (state waived immunity
to suit under Federal Employee Labor Act by operating railroad in interstate commerce).
48 Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health &
Welfare, 41 U.S.L.W. 4493 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1973).
49 Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 US. 459, 465-66 (1945); Great N.
Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54-55 (1944). Both these suits were actions to compel
state tax refunds. 323 U.S. at 460; 322 U.S. at 48. The state laws allowed refund suits in
state court, and the issue was whether the state thereby waived its immunity to suit in
federal court. 323 U.S. at 464; 322 U.S. at 53. But see Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894). In this similar case, the Court held that "a court of competent
jurisdiction in Travis County" included the federal court, and that the state had there-
fore waived its immunity under the eleventh amendment. Id. at 392; see Mississippi River
Fuel Corp. v. Cocreham, 382 F.2d 929, 932-36 (5th Cir. 1967) (consent in state statute).
50 See O'Neill v. Pennsylvania, 459 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (contract
action barred by the eleventh); Lipman v. Massachusetts, 345 F. Supp. 523 (D. Mass.
1972) (contract action barred by the eleventh). But see Daye v. Pennsylvania, 344 F.
Supp. 1337 (ED. Pa. 1972) (tort suit; waiver alleged by receipt of federal funds).
51 Contract suits are often held barred as against the state. See Hamilton Mfg. Co. v.
Trustees of State Colleges, 356 F.2d 599 (10th Cir. 1966); DeLong Corp. v. Oregon State
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LEGAL CHARACTER OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
Although courts have developed a series of working rules by which
to decide eleventh amendment issues, judicial confusion still exists re-
garding the legal character of the eleventh. Courts have called the amend-
ment both a jurisdictional question and a defense on the merits5 2 This
inconsistency is a result of judicial confusion between eleventh amend-
ment principles and sovereign immunity. The distinction between these
two concepts is frequently obscured by court decisions which speak of
"sovereign immunity as embodied in the Eleventh Amendment." 3 Al-
though sovereign immunity was originally a basis for the eleventh, "4 and
the amendment is to some extent founded on the same principle of sep-
aration of powers,55 the two doctrines are distinct. While the purpose
of sovereign immunity is to prevent courts and plaintiffs generally from
interfering with the workings of government,56 the eleventh was de-
Highway Comm'n, 233 F. Supp. 7 (D. Ore. 1964), affd, 343 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 877 (1965); Weyerhauser Co. v. State Roads Comm'n, 187 F. Supp.
766 (D. Md. 1960). But see Southern Bridge Co. v. Department of Highways, 319 F.
Supp. 948 (E.D. La. 1970); Fabrizio & Martin v. Board of Educ., 290 F. Supp. 945
(SD.N.Y. 1968); George A. Fuller Co. v. Coastal Plains, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.
La. 1968); Baton Rouge Constr. Co. v. West Hatchie Drainage Dist., 279 F. Supp. 430
(ND. Miss. 1968). Likewise, tort suits are sometimes barred by the eleventh. See Meyer-
hoff v. East Township School Dist., 280 F. Supp. 81 (M.D. Pa. 1968); Peter Kiewit Sons,
Co. v. South Dakota State Highway Comm'n, 269 F. Supp. 333 (D.S.D. 1967); Fylipoy
v. Gulf Stevedore Corp., 257 F. Supp. 166 (S.D. Tex. 1966). See also Tardan v. Chevron
Oil Co, 463 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1972) (suit to quiet title barred by eleventh).
52 Compare In re Ayres, 123 U.S. 443, 507 (1887) (eleventh is jurisdictional) 'with
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972)
(eleventh is codification of sovereign immunity) and Ward v. Ackroyd, 344 F. Supp.
1202, 1214 (D. Md. 1972) (eleventh is a "defense of sovereign immunity"). The legal
nature of the eleventh amendment creates extreme confusion in some decisions where
the court reaches the merits first and then decides that the eleventh bars consideration
of the claim. See Lipman v. Massachusetts, 345 F. Supp. 523, 526 (D. Mass. 1972); KIrker
v. Moore, 308 F. Supp. 615, 618 (S.D.W. Va. 1970).
5s See Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health
& Welfare, 41 U.S.L.W. 4493, 4495 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1973); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d
178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972); Adams v. Harris County, 316
F. Supp. 938, 943 (S.D. Tex. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 452 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 968 (1972). But see 41 U.S.L.W. at 4496 (Marshall, J., concurring)
(eleventh amendment distinct from sovereign immunity).
54 See Mathis, supra note 7, at 215-30.
55 In re Ayres, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887) (eleventh prevents states from having to ac-
count for actions before judiciary).
56 See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949); Great
N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 53-54 (1944); cf. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571-
72 (1959) (absolute immunity from suit for government officers acting within scope
of office maintains effective administration).
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signed to prohibit the federal government, through its courts, from in-
terfering in the internal functions of state government.
57
The wording of the amendment itself suggests that it raises a jurisdic-
tional question.58 Although some courts have interpreted it as merely
a defense, 59 the policy reason behind the eleventh amendment-to pre-
serve federalism-indicates that the jurisdictional interpretation is more
legitimate. Under a jurisdictional interpretation, suits would be barred
from federal courts before consideration on the merits, thereby pre-
serving the separate integrity of the state judicial system. Dismissal of
the suit for lack of jurisdiction would not be res judicata in a later suit
in a state court on the same cause of action, but would merely function
57 See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 25 (1933); Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490,
497-98 (1921). The current practical effect of this distinction is that waiver of the
eleventh amendment is a question of federal law. Parden v. Teminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184,
196 (1964); Briggs v. Sagers, 424 F.2d 130, 133 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
829 (1970); Daye v. Pennsylvania, 344 F. Supp. 1337, 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1972); S.J. Groves
& Sons Co. v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 268 F. Supp. 569, 571 (S.D.N.J. 1967).
On the other hand, waiver of sovereign immunity is a matter of state law. See O'Neill
v. Pennsylvania, 459 F.2d 1, 2 (3d Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Walstad v. University of
Minn. Hosps., 442 F.2d 634, 642 (8th Cir. 1971); Lovrinoff v. Helms Express, Inc., 309
F. Supp. 145, 147 (WD. Pa. 1970). Courts split on the intermediate question whether
federal or state law is to be employed to determine if an agency is an alter ego of the
state. Compare Centraal Stikstof Verkoopkantoor, N.V. v. Alabama State Docks Dep't.,
415 F.2d 452, 456-57 (5th Cir. 1969) (state law) and Fleming v. Upper Dublin Pub.
School Dist., 141 F. Supp. 813, 813 (E.D. Pa. 1956) (state law) 'with S.J. Groves & Sons
Co. v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 268 F. Supp. 568, 571 (S.D.N.J. 1967) (federal
law).
58 U.S. CONsT. amend. XI; note 1 supra; see Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 25 (1933);
In re Ayres, 123 U.S. 443 (1887); Centraal Stikstof Verkoopkantoor, N.V. v. Alabama
State Docks Dep't, 415 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1969). Even if the amendment is jurisdictional
:in scope, the Supreme Court has found it to be waivable. See Ford Motor Co. v. Depart-
ment of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464-65 (1945); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 20 (1933);
notes 136-137 infra and acompanying text. See also Whitner v. Davis, 410 F.2d 24, 29
(9th Cir. 1969); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 281 F. Supp. 100, 102 (ED.
La. 1968); Comment, supra note 34, at 333 n.10. This anomalous position is further sup-
ported by the holding that the issue can be raised at the Supreme Court level even
though not argued in the lower court. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
323 U.S. 459, 467 (1945); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 64 (1944) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting); Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. Cocreham, 382 F.2d 929, 932 (5th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1014 (1968).
59See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Adams, 180 U.S. 28, 37 (1901), citing Osborn v. Bank
of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 858 (1824) (where party of record not a
state, eleventh amendment question should be decided on merits rather than as jurisdic-
tional question); Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972, 974-75 (W.D. Wis. 1970),
aff'd, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (eleventh
not a jurisdictional bar to civil rights action); Weyerhauser v. State Roads Comm'n,
"187 F. Supp. 766, 770-71 (D. Md. 1960). As a defense, the eleventh could, of course, be
waived by failure to raise it. See PooRE & KOEBER, CYcLOPEDIA or FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 15.50 (1968). But see Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 467
(1945); of. United States v. Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 295 n.5 (1970).
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as a direct estoppel on the jurisdiction issue. If a state could use the
eleventh amendment as a defense, a complete bar to suit in state and
federal court might result.
Even courts which view the amendment as jurisdictional have under-
standable difficulties in classifying that jurisdiction as either subject mat-
ter or personal, because the amendment, as interpreted, bears character-
istics of both. Like personal jurisdiction, it consistently has been held
waivable6 ° On the other hand, the eleventh amendment issue may be
raised at any step of the judicial process,' and is not waived by a general
appearance and answer on the merits,62 both unique characteristics of
subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the amendment cannot be classi-
fied as relating only to either subject matter or personal jurisdiction and
should be recognized as having attributes of both."1
APPLICATION OF THE ELEVENTH
PARTIES PLAIN FF
Perhaps the only area in which the courts are consistent in their ap-
proach to the eleventh amendment is party-plaintiff problems. Although
the amendment nominally precludes federal court jurisdiction only in
cases against a state brought by citizens of another state or aliens," its
bar has been extended to include plaintiffs other than those mentioned
in the amendment itself. For example, its protective shield has been in-
terpreted to cover suits against a state by citizens of the same state.6 6 Al-
though section two of article III of the Constitution confers jurisdiction
on federal courts in suits between states, an action brought by one state
against another violates the eleventh amendment if the plaintiff state
actually is bringing the claim for an individual citizen.61 Finally, the
60 See F. JAMEs, CIvit PaocEDrR § 12.6 (1965); note 115 infra and accompanying text.
61 See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 467 (1945).
62 See id. at 466-67; see notes 123-124 infra.
63 See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEER.AL Cours § 7 (2d ed. 1970). See also F. JAMES, supra
note 60, § 12.6 (personal jurisdiction waived by appearance or answer on merits).64 See Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 41 U.S..W. 4493, 4498 n.10 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1973) (Marshall, J., con-
curring).
65 U.S. CoNsr. amend XI.
66 See Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 41 U.SJL.W. 4493, 4494 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1973); notes 32-34 supra and
accompanying text.
67See North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374-76 (1923) (dicta); cf. Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co, 405 U.S. 251, 258 n.12 (1972) (although doctrine of parens patriae
viable, held not to authorize damage action under Clayton Act). Early in the judicial
interpretation of the eleventh amendment, the Supreme Court examined the exercise
of control over litigation initiated by one state against another to determine whether
1482
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amendment has been extended to bar federal court entry when a foreign
country is plaintiff.6
8
There is also agreement, however, that the amendment does not en-
compass some legal situations to which it might extend under a broad
interpretation. For example, the amendment does not cover suits in
which the United States69 or another state70 is the actual plaintiff. Cases
in which the state is plaintiff in the court of original jurisdiction but be-
comes the defendant-in-error on appeal are similarly beyond the scope
of the amendment.71
PARTIES DEFENDANT
The crucial factor in determining whether to apply the eleventh
amendment is the remedy requested. Language to the contrary by the
courts is merely a smokescreen for the real judicial concern-the power
of the federal courts over state governments. However, most courts first
consider the superficial eleventh amendment issue, the characterization
of the party defendant, since the amendment appears to bar federal court
jurisdiction in certain cases solely because the state is the defendant. 7
2
the suit was actually one for the benefit of an individual. See New Hampshire v.
Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883). In deciding that New Hampshire was merely represent-
ing an individual interest by suing as assignee of Louisiana bonds held by a New Hamp-
shire citizen, the Court cited four factors: the bondholder paid all legal expenses, re-
tained authorization to conclude a compromise, received any state recovery, and
utilized private counsel in addition to the state attorney general. Id. at 89. The eleventh
amendment does not bar suits where the United States sues a state on behalf of indi-
viduals if the United States is also enforcing its own law. See Hodgson v. Board of
Educ., 344 F. Supp. 79, 86 (D.NJ. 1972) (action by Secretary of Labor to enforce Fair
Labor Standards Act).
68 See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934). The Court based this decision
on the practical consideration that the foreign country enjoyed immunity similar to
that of a state and could not itself be sued absent consent. Id. at 330.
69 See United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936); United States v. Texas, 143
U.S. 621, 642-43 (1892); United States v. Pennsylvania, 349 F. Supp. 1370, 1385-86 (E.D.
Pa. 1972). The eleventh may not apply if the United States is the real party in interest,
even if it is not a named plaintiff. See Marquardt Corp. v. Weber County, 360 F.2d 168,
171 (10th Cir. 1966). In Marquardt, two companies alleged that the Utah state tax was
discriminatory. Since they held a contract requiring the United States to reimburse
them for taxes paid, the court held the eleventh not applicable. Id. at 171. Impleader
of a state in a tort action by the United States is also allowable. See Lee v. Brooks, 315
F. Supp. 729, 732 (D. Hawaii 1970). See also United States v. California, 328 F.2d 729,
735-36 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 817 (1965).
70 See North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923). But see note 67 supra and
accompanying text.
'71 See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 407 (1821).
72 A suit by an individual naming the state as defendant almost certainly will be
barred by the eleventh amendment unless a waiver is found. See, e.g., Neal v. Georgia,
469 F.2d 446, 449 (5th Cir. 1972); O'Neill v. Pennsylvania, 459 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1972);
Knight v. New York, 443 F.2d 415, 417-18 (2d Cir. 1971); Janda v. Illinois, 348 F. Supp.
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Despite the eleventh amendment, a suit against an agency or political
subdivision or a state may be within federal jurisdiction if the defendant
is somehow independent of the state or is not an "alter ego" of the state. 8
In determining whether the agency or subdivision is an alter ego, the
courts look at one or a combination of characteristics of the agency
which indicate its relationship to the state. Some courts, using a dis-
tinction derived from theories of municipal sovereign immunity, 4 hold
that if the entity performs governmental rather than proprietary func-
tions, it is an alter ego.75 However, this theory is difficult to apply con-
sistently since municipalities76 and counties,77 both of which perform
governmental functions, have traditionally been held not to share the
state's eleventh amendment immunity.
568, 571 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Lipman v. Massachusetts, 345 F. Supp. 523, 526 (D. Mass.
1972); Daye v. Pennsylvania, 344 F. Supp. 1337, 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1972). But see Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Cavicchia, 311 F. Supp. 149, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(state nominal party but with no interest in outcome; held, not barred by eleventh).
However, problems arise because the party of record is not conclusive, and a suit
nominally against a party other than the state may be deemed a suit against the state.
See In Re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 487 (1887), overruling in part Osborn v. Bank of United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 264 (1824); S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. New Jersey Turnpike
Authority, 268 F. Supp. 568, 573-74 (D.N.J. 1967); notes 28-29 supra and accompanying
text. But cf. Thompson v. Fugate, 347 F. Supp. 120, 123 (E.D. Va. 1972) ("presumption"
that eleventh does not apply when named party is highway director).
Although no cases have reached the issue, the amendment probably does not protect
the District of Columbia. Cf. United States v. Carter, 41 U.S.LW. 4127 (U.S. Jan. 10,
1973) (District of Columbia not a state for purposes of section 1983).
73 See Raymond Int'l, Inc. v. M/T Dalzelleagle, 336 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
See also Miller, supra note 34, at 111.
74 See 3 K. DAvis, ADMINISTaATIvE LAW TREATisE § 25.07 (1958).
75 See Lewis v. Vermont, 289 F. Supp. 246, 248 (D. Vt. 1968); DeLong Corp. v. Oregon
State Highway Comm'n, 233 F. Supp. 7, 15-16 (D. Ore. 1964), aff'd, 343 F.2d 911 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 877 (1965). But see Raymond Int'l, Inc. v. M/T Dalzelleagle,
336 F. Supp. 679, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (governmental function not controlling); S.J.
Groves & Sons v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 268 F. Supp. 568, 575 (D.N.J. 1967)
(governmental function inconclusive). The DeLong court considered the following
factors in finding that the Highway Commission performed an "essential governmental
function" and therefore was an alter ego of the state: contracts by the Commission were
executed in the name of the state; condemnation proceedings were in the name of the
state; the Commission's funds came from state taxes and were deposited with the state
treasurer; and Commission bonds were issued in the name of the state as general obli-
gations. 233 F. Supp. at 11-12, 15-16.
76 See Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203, 216 (D. Md. 1971); S.J. Groves & Sons
v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 268 F. Supp. 568, 574 (D.N.J. 1967); N.M. Patter-
son & Sons, Ltd. v. Chicago, 176 F. Supp. 323, 324 (ND. IIl. 1959). But see Lewis v.
Vermont, 289 F. Supp. 246, 248 (D. Vt. 1968).
77 See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 228 (1964); Lincoln County v. Lun-
ing, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890); Brown v. Marshall County, 394 F.2d 498, 499-500 (6th
Cir. 1968); Universal Sur. Co. v. Lescher & Mahoney, 340 F. Supp. 303, 306 (D. Ariz.
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Instead of focusing on the purpose of the agency, other courts look
to the agency's structure to determine if it has a corporate existence
separate from that of the state. s If the only indication of corporate in-
dependence is a "sue and be sued" clause,79 or a separate fiscal existence, 8
the eleventh will bar the suit. However, a separate fiscal existence com-
bined with a "sue and be sued" clause frequently will result in a finding
of corporate independence.8'
1972); Adams v. Harris County, 316 F. Supp. 938, 944 (S.D. Tex. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 452 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 968 (1972). But cf. Miller
v. Los Angeles, 341 F.2d 964, 966 (9th Cit. 1965). See generally, Comment, State Gov-
erninental Corporation Immunity from Federal Jurisdiction Under the Eleventh Amend-
ment, 72 Dicz. L. REv. 296 (1968).
78 See, e.g., Universal Sur. Co. v. Lescher & Mahoney, 340 F. Supp. 303, 304 (D. Ariz.
1972); Southern Bridge Co. v. Department of Highways, 319 F. Supp. 948, 950 (E.D.
La. 1970); George A. Fuller Co. v. Coastal Plains, Inc. 290 F. Supp. 911, 913 (ED.
La. 1968). Simply incorporating an arm of the state does not bring it out from under
eleventh amendment protection. See Tardan v. Chevron Oil Co., 463 F.2d 651, 652 (5th
Cir. 1972).
79 See Chesapeake Bay Bridge & Tunnel Dist. v. Lauritzen, 404 F.2d 1001, 1003 (4th
Cir. 1968); Southern Bridge Co. v. Department of Highways, 319 F. Supp. 948, 950
(E.D. La. 1970); cf. Raymond Int'l v. M/T Dalzelleagle, 336 F. Supp. 679, 681 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) ("sue and be sued" clause a strong indication of independence).
80See Raymond Int'l v. M/T Dalzelleagle, 336 F. Supp. 679, 681-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Weyerhauser Co. v. State Roads Comm'n, 187 F. Supp. 766, 773 (D. Md. 1960). See also
Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171-72 (1909).
81 See Urbano v. Board of Managers, 415 F.2d 247, 250-51 (3d Cit. 1969); Universal
Sur. Co. v. Lescher & Mahoney, 340 F. Supp. 303, 305-06 (D. Ariz. 1972); George A.
Fuller Co. v. Coastal Plains, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 911, 913 (ED. La. 1968); S.J. Groves &
Sons Co. v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 268 F. Supp. 568, 574-75 (D.N.J. 1967);
White v. Umatilla County, 247 F. Supp. 918, 919 (D. Ore. 1965); cf. Aerojet General
Corp. v. Askew, 453 F.2d 819, 830 (5th Cir. 1971) (agency that holds title to property
independent of state). But see Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 315
F. Supp. 238, 247 (M.D. Pa. 1970), aft'd, 454 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1971). The state and its
alter ego are not deemed citizens for diversity purposes. See Harris v. Pennsylvania
Comm'n, 410 F.2d 1332, 1334 n.1 (3d Cir. 1969); Lowe v. Manhattan Beach City School
Dist., 222 F.2d 258, 259 (9th Cir. 1955); DeLong Corp. v. Oregon State Highway
Comm'n, 233 F. Supp. 7, 15-16 (D. Ore. 1964), aft'd, 343 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 877 (1965). However, counties have been declared a separate body
from the state and a "citizen" for diversity purposes. See White v. Umatilla County,
supra at 920.
The scope of diversity jurisdiction can neither be expanded nor limited by the states.
Although the eleventh has been held waivable, the state cannot similarly waive its non-
citizen status to create valid diversity jurisdiction since diversity jurisdiction does not
involve a privilege belonging to the state. S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. New Jersey Turn-
pike Authority, supra at 571; see Harris v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, supra at
1334 n.1; Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 281 F. Supp. 100, 102 (E.D. La.
1968). On the other hand, the state cannot limit the reach of diversity jurisdiction by
conferring alter ego status upon an agency. See Baton Rouge Contracting Co. v. West
Hatchie Drainage Dist., 279 F. Supp. 430, 432 (N.D. Miss. 1968); S.J. Groves & Sons Co.
v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, supra at 573.
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The "alter ego" limitation upon the applicability of the eleventh is
a clear example of the disjunction between words and meaning. While
the courts discuss the relative independence of the agency as a theo-
retical matter, their practical consideration in finding independence is
that a judgment against a financially separate corporation will not in-
volve a federal court in a battle with a state legislature over the proper
use of state revenues. When the court is unable to find such independ-
ence, however, the remedy requested becomes the central issue on which
the decision to apply the amendment is based. If the plaintiff requests
damages, or any other remedy requiring expenditure of state funds, the
federal courts have generally found that the eleventh precludes jurisdic-
tion.82 Conversely, most requests for injunctions which do not require
direct expenditure are not barred by the amendment; their success is
dependent on the merits of the claim. Judges are even more willing to
discount the effect of the eleventh when the plaintiff requests a declara-
tory judgment, reasoning that "the possibility of some type of affirma-
tive state action in the future to correct the illegality will not bring the
suit into conflict with the Eleventh Amendment." s
Several tests have been developed by the courts to aid them in the
categorization of the cases.8 4 Since the eleventh amendment was de-
signed to protect state treasuries, courts deciding whether to apply the
amendment will inquire if, as a direct result of an adverse judgment, the
state will be forced to pay the plaintiff. There are nominally three dif-
ferent tests employed to make this determination, but the distinctions
between them are minimal. The most expansive test simply inquires
whether the suit requests damages.85 The other two tests turn upon
8 2 See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
83 Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068, 1072 (D. Md. 1972); see Like v. Carter, 448
F.2d 798, 805 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1045 (1972); Gaither v. Sterrett, 346
F. Supp. 1095, 1099 (ND. Ind.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1070 (1972); Housing Authority v.
Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1027, 1033 (D.N.J. 1972). However, an injunction or declara-
tory judgment may prove useless if the court refuses to issue a contempt citation or
grant damages when the order is disobeyed. See Rodriquez v. Weaver, Civil No. 69 C
2615 (N.D. IlM. 1972) (although "widespread and substantial noncompliance" with
October 29, 1970 order, motion for contempt citation denied); cf. Landman v. Royster,
12 Crim. L. Rptr. 2393 (E.D. Va. Jan. 29, 1973) (although conduct of defendants vio-
lates "both the letter and the spirit of the court's order" of Oct. 30, 1971, imprisonment
not appropriate and contempt fine of $25,000 suspended on condition that immediate
steps be taken to comply with order).
84 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 386 (1902); Pennsylvania Turnpike
Comm'n v. Welsh, 188 F.2d 447, 450 (3d Cir. 1951); Miller v. Parsons, 313 F. Supp. 1150,
1151 (MD. Pa. 1970); Peter Kiewit Sons Co. v. South Dakota State Highway Comm'n,
269 F. Supp. 333, 338 (D.S.D. 1967).
85 See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); Ex parte
New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1921); Knight v. New York, 443 F.2d 415, 419, 421
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whether a judgment for the plaintiff will require the taking of monies
from the state treasury without the state's consent 6 and whether the
relief requested would require the appropriation of funds by the state
legislature.87 If any of these questions are answered affirmatively, most
courts find that the eleventh bars the action.
The most extreme effect resulting from the use of the tests is to de-
prive a plaintiff of a forum for his claim. Lack of a remedy for an in-
fringement of rights by a state is most apparent in patent and copyright
cases where federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction.88 In common law
contract or tort claims, the effect is less extreme but still can be damag-
ing to the plaintiff.89
Recently, there have been numerous actions requesting retroactive
welfare benefits from the states.9" Some courts, applying the tests literal-
ly and finding a damage claim, have barred relief upon invocation of the
eleventh by the state-defendant.91 Other courts, concerned with the in-
(2d Cir. 1971); Janda v. Illinois, 348 F. Supp. 568, 571 (N.D. IM. 1972); Alaska v. O/S
Lynn Kendall, 310 F. Supp. 433, 435 (D. Alas. 1970). See also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1, 20-21 (1890) (contract damage action barred).
86 See, e.g., Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 236 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41
U.S..W. 3527 (U.S. Apr. 2, 1973); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972); Urbano v. Board of Managers, 415 F.2d 247, 250-51
(3d Cir. 1969); Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Trustees of State Colleges, 356 F.2d 599, 601 (10th
Cir. 1966).
87 See, e.g., Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068, 1072 (D. Md. 1972); Dews v. Henry,
297 F. Supp. 587, 592 (D. Ariz. 1969); Shepheard v. Godwin, 280 F. Supp. 869, 876 (ED.
Va. 1968).
8828 U.S.C. S 1338(a) (1970); see Wfhtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 781 (8th Cir. 1962)
(copyright action against state barred by eleventh); Hercules, Inc. v. Minnesota State
Highway Dep't, 337 F. Supp. 795, 797, 800-01 (D. Minn. 1972) (patent infringement
action against state barred as to damages, but not as to injunctive relief).
89 Sovereign immunity may bar the plaintiff from a hearing in state court. See notes
54-56 supra and accompanying text. However, that issue is beyond the scope of this
Note. See generally Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 AD. L. RFv. 383 (1970);
Note, Krause v. State: Is Ohio Sovereign Immunity Unconstitutional?, 33 U. Pnr. L. REv.
611 (1972); Comment, State Immunity from Suit Without Consent-Scope & Implica-
tions, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 879 (1971).
The courts have split on whether a claim against a state by an attorney for fees for
work done for the state is barred by the eleventh. Compare Sincock v. Obara, 320 F.
Supp. 1098, 1104-05 (D. Del. 1970) (suit for fees barred) qwth Iowa v. Union Asphalt
& Roadoils, Inc., 409 F.2d 1239, 1244 (8th Cir. 1969) (suit not barred because court had
ancillary jurisdiction over action) and Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, Civil No. 3540 (W.D.
Wis. 1962), reproduced in Sincock v. Obara, 320 F. Supp. 1098, 1106-07 (D. Del. 1970)
(federal court can order plaintiff state to pay special master's fees).
90 See, e.g., Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3527 (US.
Apr. 2, 1973); Like v. Carter, 448 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1045
(1972); Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967), aft'd, 394 U.S. 618
(1969).
91 See Like v. Carter, 41 U.S.L.W. 2406 (E.D. Mo., Jan. 6, 1973); Rothstein v. Wyman,
467 F.2d 226, 238 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3527 (U.S. Apr. 2, 1973);
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justice of allowing states which have disobeyed federal statutes or the
Constitution to avoid permanently the payment of welfare benefits and
obedience to federal law, have developed various ways of circumventing
the eleventh. At least one court has avoided the eleventh by stating that
it was not granting damages but rather was giving restitution of monies
unconstitutionally withheld.92 Another avoidance technique is to view
a grant of past due benefits to one plaintiff as a redistribution of funds
previously allocated for expenditure to the class of which the plaintiff
is a member.93 Still other courts have ignored the eleventh amendment
problem altogether.94 Although a split now exists between the Second
and Eighth Circuits as to whether the eleventh bars payment of retro-
active benefits,95 there is no inherent reason why these techniques can-
not be used in other types of situations where strict application of the
damage-injunction distinction would be inequitable.
If a court is unwilling to employ these techniques, and the suit is
against an individual, still another means of avoiding the effect of the
eleventh may be available. The Civil Rights Act of 187196 authorizes
damage actions against persons acting under color of state law to deny
constitutional rights, privileges and immunities.97 Since the Act can be
Francis v. Davidson, 340 F. Supp. 351, 370 (D. Md.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 904 (1972); West-
berry v. Fisher, 309 F. Supp. 12,18 (D. Me. 1970).
92See Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331, 338 & n5 (D. Conn.), aft'd, 394 U.S.
618 (1969). See also Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203, 218 (D. Md. 1971); Levy,
The Aftermath of Victory: The Availability of Retroactive Welfare Benefits Illegally
Denied-Part I, 3 CLEm NGHOUSE REv. 253, 258 (1970).
93 See Henry v. Betit, 323 F. Supp. 418, 421 (D. Alas. 1971); Dews v. Henry, 297 F.
Supp. 587, 592 (D. Ariz. 1969).
94See Rothstein v. Wyman, 336 F. Supp. 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in part, 467 F.2d
226 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3527 (U.S. Apr. 2, 1973); Doe v. Swank,
332 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Ill.) (per curiam), a)fd sub nora., Weaver v. Doe, 404 U.S. 98
(1971); Grubb v. Sterrett, 315 F. Supp. 990 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 400 U.S. 922 (1970);
Brooks v. Yeatman, 311 F. Supp. 364 (M.D. Tenn. 1970).
95 Compare Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W.
3527 (U.S. Apr. 2, 1973) (payments barred) 'with Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th
Cit. 1973), cert. granted sub nom., Edelman v. Jordan, 41 U.S.L.W. 3644 (No. 72-1410)
(U.S. June 11, 1973) (payments not barred by eleventh). Other circuit courts and the
Supreme Court have affirmed lower court decisions which granted payments without
considering the eleventh amendment issue. See, e.g., Weaver v. Doe, 404 U.S. 987 (1971),
aff'g 332 F. Supp. 61 (W.D. Ill.); Sterrett v. Grub, 400 U.S. 922 (1972), aff'g 315 F. Supp.
990 (ND. Ind.); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), aff'g 270 F. Supp. 331 (D.
Conn. 1967).
96 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
97 Id. The federal district courts have original jurisdiction over section 1983 claims.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970).
One major problem with section 1983 suits is that states and cities have been held not
to be "persons" for section 1933 purposes. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961)
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invoked successfully only when the court finds that the judgment will
operate solely against the specific individual who has violated the stat-
ute,98 its effectiveness is limited. Furthermore, damages are frequently
disallowed if the official is found to have acted in good faith within the
scope of his official duty.99
(cities); Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41
U.S..W. 3527 (U.S. Apr. 2, 1973) (states); Whitner v. Davis, 410 F.2d 24, 29 (9th
Cir. 1969) (states); Francis v. Davidson, 340 F. Supp. 351, 370 (D. Md.), aff'd, 409-U.S.
904 (1972) (states). Therefore, actions requesting reinstatement with back pay which
allege dismissal contrary to section 1983 may be held actions against the state as payor
of potential damages, and barred by the eleventh. Compare Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F.
Supp. 203, 211 (D. Md. 1971) (action barred) wiith Miller v. Helsey, 347 F. Supp. 192,
197 (E.D. Ark. 1972) (mem.) (action allowed) and Harkiess v. Sweeney Independent
School Dist., 427 F.2d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971) (action
allowed).
Courts are split on whether state agencies are persons within the meaning of section
1983. Compare Lee v. Board of Regents, 441 F.2d 1257, 1260 (7th Cir. 1971) and Louisi-
ana State Bd. of Educ. v. Baker, 339 F.2d 911, 911 (5th Cir. 1964) (agency a person
within section 1983) with Whitner v. Davis, 410 F.2d 24, 29 (9th Cir. 1969) (agency
not a person within the meaning of section 1983). See generally Levy, supra note 92.
9 8 See In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 502-06 (1887); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972); Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203,
211 (D. Md.), aff'd, 451 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 917 (1972).
Judges, legislators and "quasi-judicial" officials have been found immune from section
1983 suits as well as other actions because of common law immunity. Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (judges have absolute immunity but police only qualified im-
munity); Teeney v. Bandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (legislators immune); Muller
v. Wachtel, 345 F. Supp. 160, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (judges); Eslinger v. Thomas, 340
F. Supp. 886, 893 (D.S.C. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, - F.2d - (4th Cir. 1973)
(legislators immune); Posner v. New York, 340 F. Supp. 320, 323 (N.D.N.Y. 1972)
(judges). Contra, Hackin v. Lockwood, 361 F.2d 499, 501-02 (9th Cir. 1966) (suit against
state supreme court justices under section 1343 barred by neither eleventh nor immunity
of judges). See also Levy, supra note 92. The Supreme Court will reconsider the issue.
See Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. granted sub nom., O'Shea
v. Littleton, 41 U.SL.W. 3527 (U.S. Apr. 2, 1973).
99Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967); Eslinger v. Thomas, 340 F. Supp. 886, 895
(D.S.C. 1972), re'd on other grounds, - F.2d - (4th Cir. 1973); Westberry v.
Fisher, 309 F. Supp. 12, 17-18 (D. Me. 1970). But see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187
(1961) (wilfulness not a prerequisite for recovery of damages under section 1983);
Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203, 214 (D. Md.), aff'd, 451 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1971),
petition for cert. dismissed, 407 U.S. 917 (1972) (good faith no defense when racial dis-
crimination practiced). See also Levy, supra note 92.
Some courts are inconsistent in their recognition of the distinction between a damage
action against an individual state officer and one against the state itself. Compare Roth-
stein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 230 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.SL.W. 3527 (U.S.
Apr. 2, 1973) (distinction recognized) and Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203, 214
(D. Md.), aff'd, 451 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1971), petition for cert. dismissed, 407 U.S. 917
(1972) (distinction between official and individual capacity recognized; damages allowed
only in the latter) with Knight v. New York, 443 F.2d 415, 419-21 (2d Cir. 1971) (dam-
age claim for unconstitutional taking by official is suit against state) and Francis v.
1973] 1489
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Damage actions brought under federal statutes which have fewer con-
stitutional overtones than section 1983 are generally considered barred
by the eleventh unless there has been state or congressional waiver of
the protection.10 Claims based on state statute or common law require
an even more explicit demonstration of waiver which is found only in-
frequently.'
0'
While successful damage actions against state officials in federal courts
by-pass the eleventh only infrequently, injunction requests are far more
likely to succeed, particularly when brought under the Constitution.
10 2
This success stems in large part from judicial differentiation between
suits against officers and suits against the state. The development of this
distinction began in 1824 when Chief Justice Marshall determined that
so long as the defendant official was directly responsible for the allegedly
unconstitutional act, a suit seeking to enjoin his act was not barred by
Davidson, 340 F. Supp. 351 (D. Md.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 904 (1972) (distinction not recog-
nized). See also Board of Trustees v. Davis, 396 F.2d 730, 732 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 962 (1968). Where the distinction is not recognized and the court applies the
treasury rationale of the eleventh strictly, damage actions against officials have been
barred even for acts allegedly in contravention of section 1983. See Francis v. Davidson,
supra at 370.
Actions brought under section 1983 should not be confused with pure "constitutional
torts"-damage actions based solely on violation of the Constitution and not yet limited
by the defense of good faith and the doctrine of absolute immunity. See Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). The
Court explicitly stated that there is an underlying power to grant such a remedy for
violation of "legal rights" even without any explicit statutory authority. Id. at 396-97; see
District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1973) (dictum). See also 33 Omo
ST. LJ. 205 (1972); 46 Tur.. L. REv. 816 (1972). Although their future is uncertain,
constitutional torts may become a viable alternative to some section 1983 damage actions
against state officials.
100 See notes 115-144 infra and accompanying text.
101 See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 465-66 (1945) (state
statute); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54-55 (1944) (state statute); Wal-
stead v. University of Minn. Hosp., 442 F.2d 634, 642 (8th Cir. 1971) (tort); MacDonald
v. Board of Regents, 371 F.2d 818, 819 (6th Cit. 1970) (per curiam) (tort).
102 See Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 304 (1952); Williams
v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422, 428-29 (10th Cir. 1971); McCoy v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ.,
332 F.2d 915, 917 (5th Cit. 1964); Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156, 160-61
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957); Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F.
Supp. 662, 669 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203, 217 (D. Md.),
afi'd, 451 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1971), petition for cert. dismissed, 407 U.S. 917 (1972).
Requests for equitable remedies which are brought under state statutes or common
law are almost as unsuccessful as damage actions on similar causes of action. See Missouri
v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 27-28 (1933) (eleventh bars injunction against state intervenor in
probate proceedings); Tardan v. Chevron Oil Co., 463 F.2d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1972)
(eleventh bars suit to quiet title against state mineral board).
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the eleventh amendment."' After an 80 year hiatus, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed this position in Ex parte Young, 04 where the Court held:
[T] he officer in proceeding under such [unconstitutional] enact-
ment comes into conflict with the superior authority of [the] Con-
stitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or represen-
tative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences
of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to
him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of
the United States.105
This distinction between acts of an official and acts of the state is
obviously a fiction which enables federal courts to enjoin acts of the
state which can, of course, act only through its officers.0 6 Successful
103 Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 836-37 (1824); see notes
27-29 supra and accompanying text.
104 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
105 Id. at 159-60. Actions to enjoin the impairment of a state contract obligation have
not benefited from this theory, partially because the Young Court specifically dis-
tinguished Ayers as involving, in reality, an action to compel specific performance by
the state on a contract. Id. at 151-53; see Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151,
168, 173 (1909); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20 (1890); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 502-
05 (1887); Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Trustees of the State Colleges, 356 F.2d 599, 601 (10th
Cit. 1966); Lipman v. Massachusetts, 345 F. Supp. 523, 526 (D. Mass. 1972); Warner v.
Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund, 277 F. Supp. 736, 739-40 (ED. La. 1967);
Brown Bros. Equip. Co. v. Michigan, 266 F. Supp. 506, 507 (W.D. Mich. 1967); DeLong
Corp. v. Oregon State Highway Comm'n, 233 F. Supp. 7, 17 (D. Ore. 1964), aff'd, 343
F.2d 911 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 877 (1965). See also L. JAFFEE, JurIAL CON-
TROL or ADMINISERATW ACTION 221-22 (1965). The bar applies to these contract suits
whether the named defendant is a state, an agency, or an individual.
Claims of unconstitutional impairment of contracts are less common today than they
were when Ayers was decided. In one of the few cases which have arisen, the Fifth
Circuit held that the eleventh was not a bar to a suit to enjoin the impairment of a land
sale contract. McGuire v. Sadler, 337 F.2d 902, 905-06 (5th Cir. 1964); of. Pilling, supra
note 15, at 475-77.
1 0 6 See Louisiana State Bd. of Educ. v. Baker, 339 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1964);
Warner v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund, 277 F. Supp. 736, 740 (E.D.
La. 1967); 3 K. DAvis, supra note 74, § 27.03, at 553; L. JAFEE, supra note 105, at 200;
Roady, Lee, Land, Larson and Malone-Sovereign Inmunity Revisited, 43 Trx. L. Riv.
1062 (1965). Although Ex parte Young appears to apply only to state officers, some
courts have found it applicable to state agencies. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ. v. Baker,
339 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964); see Ross v. Lucey, 349 F. Supp. 264, 267 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
When a suit alleges a violation of the fourteenth amendment through state action,
Young results in the anomoly that acts of officials are considered to be state action for
fourteenth amendment purposes, but not state action under the eleventh amendment.
Eslinger v. Thomas, 340 F. Supp. 886, 893 (D.S.C. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, -
F.2d - (4th Cir. 1973); 2 W. BARRON & A. HoLTzorr, FEDERAL PRACnCE & PROCFEDURE
5 626, at 445 (C. Wright ed. 1961); see Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203, 216-17
(D. Md.), aff'd, 451 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1971), petition for cert. dismissed, 407 U.S. 917
(1972).
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suits against officials can be maintained both where the official individual-
ly has acted unconstitutionally and where he has enforced an unconsti-
tutional state law.1 7 If the act or statute enforced is unconstitutional,
the official's belief that his action was within his authority is immaterial. 08
Since Young itself involved a constitutional claim, courts are most will-
ing to use the fiction to provide jurisdiction to enjoin unconstitutional
acts of state officers.1 9
Allegations of actions contrary to federal statutes also have been the
basis for use of the Young fiction. In particular, injunction actions
brought under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871110 are more
consistently successful than damage claims brought under the same
statute. The same court which will enjoin section 1983 violations will
frequently refuse to grant damages to remedy past violations."' Courts
107 See Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 303-06 (1952); Scott v.
Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 67-70 (1897).
108 209 U.S. at 155-56, 167. On the other hand, a mere tortious act, even outside the
scope of authority, should not break down the eleventh amendment barrier, although
it might bar a sovereign immunity defense. See Board of Trustees of Ark. A. & Al.
College v. Daniels, 396 F.2d 730, 732-33 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 (1968).
But see Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 703 (1949)
(tortious action may be within the general scope of authority in which case sovereign
immunity is a valid defense).
109 See, e.g., Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 305 (1953) (col-
lection of taxes from tax-exempt corporation); Like v. Carter, 448 F.2d 798, 802 (8th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1045 (1972) (failure to act on welfare applications
within alloted time); McGuire v. Sadler, 337 F.2d 902, 906 (5th Cir. 1964) (fraudulent
taking of plaintiff's land by state commissioner); Orleans Parish School Dist. v. Bush, 242
F.2d 156, 161 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957) (segregation of schools);
Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068, 1072 (D. Md. 1972) (challenge to state system of
financing education); Hercules Inc. v. Minnesota State Highway Dep't, 337 F. Supp.
795, 799 (D. Minn. 1972) (patent infringement).
The success in relying on Young is dependent, in part, on whether the allegation of
the unconstitutional act is considered before any inquiry into the effect of the pro-
posed remedy on the state treasury. If Young is considered first, the suit will survive a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Cf. 209 U.S. at 159-60; Waller v. Professional
Ins. Corp, 299 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 1962) (action of official outside scope of authority
prerequisite to jurisdiction); Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662, 669
(E.D. Wis. 1971) (eleventh no bar to "patently unconstitutional action by official");
National Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Johnson, 317 F. Supp. 1330, 1334 (S.D. Tex. 1970)
(suit against official action within discretionary authority barred by sovereign immunity).
If the court first considers the monetary effect of an adverse judgment, however, it may
bar a suit nominally against an individual as a suit against the state. See, e.g., Ford Motor
Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); Rothstein v. Wyman, 467
F.2d 226, 236 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3527 (U.S. Apr. 2, 1973); Francis
v. Davidson, 340 F. Supp. 351, 370 (D. Md. 1972), aff'd, 409 U.S. 904 (1972).
110 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) (jurisdictional counter-
part to section 1983); notes 96-100 supra and accompanying text.
111See Francis v. Davidson, 340 F. Supp. 351, 368, 370 (D. Md. 1972), aff'd, 409 U.S.
904 (1972) (injunction proper but damages barred by eleventh); Westberry v. Fisher,
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also have employed the fiction to facilitate enjoining acts of state officials
in conflict with the Social Security Act112 and the Federal Aid Highway
Act of 1968.113
Although redress against the state appears to be circumscribed severely
by the eleventh amendment, the federal courts do possess the power to
remedy injuries to citizens. This is particularly true where the Young
fiction can be invoked, as in federal causes of action, or where a court
interprets requests for monies as restitution of funds improperly with-
held rather than as damages. These techniques are useful, but the con-
fusion engendered by their application could be mitigated by a return
to Chief Justice Marshall's conception of the purpose of the amend-
ment: to preserve the state's interest in adjustment of its debts or other




The Supreme Court has maintained for the last 80 years that the bar
of the eleventh amendment is not absolute; the power of the state to
forego its privilege has not been questioned. 115 Therefore, once the
amendment is found applicable, courts focus on the possibility that the
state has waived its eleventh amendment protection.
309 F. Supp. 12, 14, 20 (D. Me. 1970) (injunction issued; damages barred by eleventh).
A finding that section 1983 overcomes the eleventh amendment is in fact a decision
that when an official is found to have violated section 1983, Young is applicable. See
Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1352-53 (E.D.N.C. 1970); Miller
v. Parsons, 313 F. Supp. 1150, 1151-52 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Roth v. Board of Regents of
State Colleges, 310 F. Supp. 972, 974-75 (WD. Wis. 1970), afi'd, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir.
1971), reV'd on other grounds, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
These statements should not be interpreted to mean that a suit nominally against a
state and alleging a civil rights violation will avoid the eleventh. See, e.g., Miller v.
Hulsey, 347 F. Supp. 192, 197 (ED. Ark. 1972) (eleventh extends to alter ego state
agency but not to individual commissioners when section 1983 violation alleged); Muller
v. Wachtel, 345 F. Supp. 160, 161 (SD.N.Y. 1972) (eleventh extends to name state de-
fendant even where section 1983 violation alleged); Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp.
203, 211 (D. Md.), aff'd, 451 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1971), petition for cert. dismissed, 407
U.S. 917 (1972) (where state would have to pay money, section 1983 does not override
eleventh). See also note 96 supra.
11242 U.S.C. S§ 604, 1316, 1384 (1970); see Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 241
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3527 (U.S. Apr. 2, 1973).
i3 23 U.S.C. § 128a (1970); see Thompson v. Fugate, 347 F. Supp. 120, 123 (E.D. Va.
1972).
114 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 405 (1821). See also L. JAFF E, supra
note 105, at 222.
15 Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co, 377 U.S. 184, 186 (1964); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S.
436, 447 (1883). See also Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Depart-
ment of Pub. Health & Welfare, 41 U.S.L.W. 4493, 4498 n. 10 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1973)
(Marshall, J., concurring); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459,
464-65 (1945).
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WAIVER BY APPEARANCE
The Supreme Court first explicitly recognized eleventh amendment
waiver, as distinguished from sovereign immunity waiver, in Clark v.
Bernard."6 The Court found that when Rhode Island became a positive
actor in the suit by intervening as a plaintiff,"" jurisdiction was conferred
upon the federal courts to enter judgment against the state "to the full
extent required for ... complete determination" of the suit.118 The Court
modified this statement in Missouri v. Fiske,"9 by holding that a state
could become a plaintiff-intervenor for limited purposes without waiving
the eleventh, even in claims for injunctive relief.20 The three federal
courts since Fiske which have considered the waiver effect of a state
appearance to contest the merits have disagreed, two finding a total
waiver,' 2' and the third finding a waiver only on claims in the nature
of recoupment or set-off.
2 2
On the other hand, immunity is not waived by a mere procedural ap-
pearance in federal court by a representative of a defendant state, 2 ' nor
by an answer on the merits. 24 The state can raise this issue at any point
in the proceedings, even in the Supreme Court.
25
WAIVER BY STATE CONSTITUTION, STATUTE OR DECISION
A state can, by constitution, statute, or decision waive eleventh amend-
ment protection either in general or in a limited class of cases.'26 This
waiver must be a clear and unambiguous indication of the state's inten-
tion to submit to suit in federal court. 2 7 Several courts requiring an ex-
116 108 U.S. 436 (1883).
117 Id. at 447-48.
118 Id. at 448.
l9 290 U.S. 18 (1933).
120 Id. at 25.
121 See Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc, 409 F.2d 1239, 1244 (8th Cir. 1969);
Rank v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 1, 67 (S.D. Cal. 1956), modified, 293 F.2d 340 (9th
Cr. 1961), modified, 307 F.2d 96 (9th Cit. 1962), modified sub nom., Dugan v. Rank, 372
U.S. 609 (1963) and Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963).
'
22 See Alaska v. O/S Lynn Kendall, 310 F. Supp. 433, 435 (D. Alas. 1970).
123 Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 466-69 (1945); Aerojet-
General Corp. v. Askew, 453 F.2d 819, 828 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892
(1972); Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. Cocreham, 382 F.2d 929, 932 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1014 (1968); Comment, States-Waiver of State Inmmunity to Suit
'with Special Reference to Suits in Federal Courts, 45 MicHI. L. REV. 348, 360 (1947).
124 Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 466-69 (1945); Aerojet-
General Corp. v. Askew, 453 F.2d 819, 828 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892
(1972); MacDonald v. Board of Regents, 371 F.2d 818, 819 (6th Cir. 1967) (per curiam).
125 Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 467 (1945).
126 See id. at 462.
127 Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944).
(Vol. 61:14731494
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plicit consent by the state import the requirement from habeas corpus
cases that waiver must be an "intentional relinquishment or abandon-
ment of a known right or privilege." 128 The use of this habeas corpus
standard in the context of the eleventh amendment waiver by the state
is somewhat disingenuous, since habeas decisions involve the waiver of
crucial legal rights of individuals in quasi-criminal proceedings. Where
personal freedom is not at stake, the use of such a strict test exalts form
over substance.12  Furthermore, since a state can waive only through
agents, it can never have personal knowledge of the rights which it re-
linquishes. One result of this strict interpretation of eleventh amendment
waiver is the finding that statutory consent by the state to suit, without
clear specification that the consent extends to suit in federal court, does
not constitute consent to suit in the federal courts.8 0
CONSTRUCTIVE WAIVER
The doctrine of constructive waiver by entry into a sphere of federal
regulation evolved from Parden v., Terminal Ry. Co.' where the Su-
preme Court found that by operation of a railroad engaged in interstate
commerce, Alabama had consented to suit in federal court under the
Federal Employer's Liability Act.8 2 The Court declared that "when a
l2SEmployees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health
& Welfare, 452 F.2d 820, 825 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 41 U.SL.W. 4493 (U.S. Apr. 18,
1973), citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) and Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963); see Daye v. Pennsylvania, 344 F. Supp. 1337, 1343 (E.D. Pa. 1972); DeLong Corp.
v. Oregon State Highway Comm'n, 233 F. Supp. 7, 19 (D. Ore. 1964), aft'd, 343 F.2d
911 (9th Cir." 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 877 (1965). See also Note, supra note 19, at
336-45. But see Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184, 200 (1964) (White, J., dis-
senting).
129 See Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 59 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing) (consent not dependent on ritualistic formula).
130 See id.; Knight v. New York, 443 F.2d 415, 419 (2d Cir. 1971); Southern Bridge
Co. v. Department of Highways, 319 F. Supp. 948, 951 (ED. La. 1970); Adams v. Harris
County, 316 F. Supp. 938, 946 (S.D. Tex. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 452 F.2d 994
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 968 (1972); Fylipoy v. Gulf Stevedore Corp., 257
F. Supp. 166, 169 (S.D. Tex. 1966). But cf. Universal Sur. Co. v. Lescher & Mahoney,
340 F. Supp. 303, 306 (D. Ariz. 1972) (policy reasons for recognition of state's immunity
from suit are negated by its general consent to suit in state courts); Southern Bridge
Co. v. Department of Highways, 319 F. Supp. 948, 951 (ED. La. 1970) (immunity not
available to distinct political subdivisions of state). See also Huckins v. Board of Regents,
263 F. Supp. 622, 624 (E.D. Mich. 1967) (purchase of liability insurance does not waive
immunity in federal court).
131 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
132 Id. at 192; see Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1970). The Court
had hinted that it might find waiver merely by entry into the federal sphere in Petty v.
Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, where two states had entered into an interstate com-
pact to build a bridge. 359 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1959). However, in Petty, there was a
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State leaves the sphere that is exclusively its own and enters into activ-
ities subject to congressional regulation, it subjects itself to that regula-
tion as fully as if it were a private person or corporation." '3I It is possible
that in applying this broad-reaching proposition, the Parden court in
effect held that the state must know it is entering the federal sphere in
order to waive immunity.11
4
In its recent decision of Employees of the Department of Public Health
& Welfare v. Department of Public Health & Welfare,"5 the Supreme
Court reconsidered the scope of the Parden doctrine. In Employees the
Supreme Court was asked to determine if the state of Missouri had
waived its eleventh amendment protection when it continued to operate
state institutions and homes for delinquents after the 1966 amendments
to the Fair Labor Standards Act, which subjected these facilities to
FLSA regulation for the first time.136 Speaking for the Court, Justice
specific proviso in the compact retaining federal jurisdiction in causes of action arising
out of the interstate commerce activities of the states. Id. at 277.
The Parden Court held that "t]o read a 'sovereign immunity exception' into the Act
would result ... in a right without a remedy. . . ." 377 U.S. at 190. This argument
makes sense as applied to common law sovereign immunity, which would bar recovery
in both federal and state courts. However, the conclusion the Court draws from its
statement is that there is jurisdiction over the suit in federal district court, an unneces-
sary result since the Federal Employer's Liability Act vests concurrent jurisdiction in
state courts. Id. at 190 n.8; see 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1970). The conclusion indicates a finding
of eleventh amendment as well as sovereign immunity waiver, and demonstrates the
confusion between the two concepts.
133 377 U.S. at 196.
134 See id. at 192.
135 41 U.S.L.W. 4493 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1973).
136Id. at 4494; see Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601,
§ 102, 80 Stat. 831, amending Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 3, 50 Star. 1060,
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), (b) (4) (1970). The constitutionality of these sections
was upheld in Maryland v. Wirtz as a legitimate exercise of the power of Congress
over interstate commerce. 392 U.S. 183, 198-99 (1968). The Wirtz Court explicitly re-
fused to rule on the waiver issue. Id. at 200. Prior to the Employees decision, the circuits
had split on the waiver effect of the 1966 amendments. The Eighth Circuit's finding of
no waiver was based on the theory that Congress in the Fair Labor Standards Act did
not adequately inform the states that continued operation of state hospitals would con-
stitute entry into a federal sphere of regulation. Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health
& Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 452 F.2d 820, 826 (8th Cir., 1971),
aff'd, 41 U.S.L.W. 4493 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1973); see Hickman v. Idaho State School &
Hosp., 339 F. Supp. 463, 465 (D. Idaho 1972) (Hobson's choice between closing school
and waiver of immunity means continued operation is not waiver). The Tenth Circuit,
however, found waiver unimportant. Briggs v. Sagers, 424 F.2d 130, 134 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970).
One of the reasons for confusion in the Fair Labor Standards Act cases is that the
operation of state hospitals traditionally has not been regarded as an activity involving
interstate commerce. Therefore, a state making the decision to operate such a hospital
may not have realized that it was entering into the federal sphere of influence and
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Douglas found that Missouri had not waived its constitutional immunity
to suit in federal court, noting that:
"It could . . . be surprising . . . to infer that Congress deprived
Missouri of her constitutional immunity without changing the
[FLSA] under which she could not be sued or indicating in some
way by dear language that the constitutional immunity was swept
away." 137
Since the Court refused to overrule Parden,3 8 the scope of construc-
tive waiver is still uncertain. The only reasonable interpretation of the
Employees decision is that waiver is more difficult to show where Con-
gress has not clearly conditioned the state's subjecting itself to regulation
on relinquishment of eleventh amendment immunity. 3 9 Therefore, ac-
ceptance of federal funds may continue to provide excellent grounds
for finding state waiver of the eleventh amendment. It can be inferred
from acceptance of federal monies that a state has knowingly and will-
ingly subjected itself to federal regulation by the Congress and the Ex-
ecutive. Regulation by the federal judiciary, the main interpreter of these
thereby waiving its eleventh amendment immunity. This situation was more likely before
Maryland v. Wirtz. 392 US. 183 (1968).
Even when states have entered into activities which have been more generally subject
to congressional regulation, courts have been uncertain of the waiver effect. For ex-
ample, courts have disagreed on the question of whether states building bridges or tun-
nels involving navigable waterways have thereby waived their immunity to suit in fed-
eral court. Compare Chesapeake Bay Bridge & Tunnel Dist. v. Lauritzen, 404 F.2d 1001,
1003 (4th Cir. 1968) (waiver) and Adams v. Harris County, 316 F. Supp. 938, 947 (S.D.
Tex. 1970) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds, 452 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 968 (1972) (waiver) 'with Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. Department of
Transp., 423 F.2d 104, 106 (3d Cir. 1970) (no waiver) and DeLong Corp. v. Oregon
State Highway Comm'n, 233 F. Supp. 7, 18-19 (D. Ore. 1964), aff'd, 343 F.2d 911 (9th
Cir. 1965) cert. denied, 382 U.S. 877 (1965) (no waiver). See also Daye v. Pennsylvania,
344 F. Supp. 1337, 1349 (ED. Pa. 1972) (applying for and accepting federal funds for
interstate highway; no waiver); 50 B.U.. REv. 590 (1970). Two courts seem to have
confused jurisdiction with a statement of a valid cause of action by finding no waiver
because the regulation to which the state had subjected itself did not provide a remedy.
See Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. Department of Transp., 423 F.2d 104, 105-06
(3d Cir. 1970) (bridge over navigable waters); Centraal Stikstof Verkoopkantoor, N.V.
v. Alabama State Docks Dep't, 415 F.2d 452, 455-56 (5th Cir. 1969) (international ship-
ping).
137 41 U.S.L.W. at 4495.
138 Id.
139 The Court also noted that Parden could be distinguished as involving proprietary,
rather than governmental activities, such as mental hospitals. Id. This is consistent with
the Second Circuit's interpretation of Parden. See Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226,
238 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3527 (U.S. Apr. 2, 1973); Knight v. New
York, 443 F.2d 415, 418 (2d Cir. 1971). .
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federal statutes and regulations, should be regarded as a necessary con-
conitant.
Lower courts have interpreted acceptance of federal funds as sufficient
to subject the state to suit in federal court where an individual brings an
action to force state compliance with the federal statutes and regulations
under which the state receives federal monies.140 This finding may be
based in part on a belief that the individuals bringing such actions are
acting as "private Attorney-Generals [sic]," 141 and represent not only
their own interests but those of the United States as well. Since suits
by the United States are not subject to the eleventh amendment bar," 2
these private injunction actions should not be subject either.
As in other areas, however, courts have found that a distinction should
be made between claims for damages and suits for injunctive relief, with
the eleventh providing greater protection in damage actions."' A plain-
tiff claiming damages in a suit against the state may not be as successful
in urging that the state has waived its eleventh amendment immunity
-by accepting federal funds." 4 In deciding waiver, especially waiver
founded on entry into the federal sphere, courts finally must face the
essential eleventh amendment problem-the power of the federal govern-
ment, whether court or Congress, to regulate the activities of the states.
CONCLUSION
The single most overwhelming fact about eleventh amendment cases
is their complete confusion. The fictions which surround the amend-
ment, both the Young fiction and the doctrine of constructive waiver,
obscure the effect of the decisions in which they are employed. The
result is that no clear distinction has been made between uses which are
consistent with the purpose of the amendment and those which are not.
When a plaintiff raises a common law claim with no constitutional
implications, the restrictions placed on federal court jurisdiction by the
140See Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 454 F.2d 613, 625 (3d
Cir. 1971) (dictum) (interstate highway funds); Ward v. Ackroyd, 344 F. Supp. 1202,
1214-15 (D. Md. 1972) (interstate highway funds). A finding of waiver is often un-
necessary in welfare actions, because courts can invoke the Young fiction. See notes 102-
105 supra and accompanying text.
141 Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320
U.S. 707 (1943).
142 See notes 66-68 supra and accompanying text.
143 Ward v. Ackroyd, 344 F. Supp. 1202, 1214-15 (D. Md. 1972).
144 See, e.g., Knight v. New York, 443 F.2d 415, 418-22 (2d Cir. 1971); Daye v. Penn-
sylvania, 344 F. Supp. 1337, 1349 (ED. Pa. 1972); DeLong v. Oregon State Highway
Coomm'n, 233 F. Supp. 7, 18-19 (D. Ore. 1964), aff'd, 343 F.2d 911 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 877 (1965).
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amendment must be respected. The plaintiff may still have a remedy,
because the suit may yet be cognizable in state court. Furthermore, these
claims will raise questions of state law in which the state courts, not the
federal courts, have the greatest competence. Similarly, where the claim
is based on a right created by a state statute, the state should have the
option of restricting the plaintiff to state court.
On the other hand, since the purpose of the amendment is to protect
both sovereignties within the federal system and not to provide total
state immunity from suit, the eleventh should not be applied when there
is friction between the policies of the two levels of government. Con-
flicts may arise when state action or policy contradicts either the Con-
stitution or federal statutes. Even actions which appear to result only in
common law claims may in fact raise constitutional issues, such as ap-
propriation of property without due process or impairment of a con-
tractual obligation. In such situations the eleventh does not bar jurisdic-
tion and the federal courts can grant all necessary remedies against the
state by name.
Today the courts utilize the eleventh in such a broad range of cases
that not only its legitimacy but also its meaning is lost. The eleventh
amendment must be narrowly construed and should be relegated, once
again, to its original purpose of barring common law claims against
states from federal court.
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